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14. ABSTRACT The continuing coordination and implementation of the civilian interagency arena is proceeding in the wrong direction. Integration within existing geographic combatant commands (GCCs) will not provide civilian interagency members the required leadership, authorities, funding or coordination needed to develop a robust operational and regional capacity and capability. This is essential for the nation to effectively employ all elements of its power. Additionally, the Department of State (DOS) is currently designated as the lead agency for overseas efforts of the civilian interagency. To accomplish this successfully requires conducting sustained engagement on a regional basis and the requisite authority to lead interagency efforts. The DOS must relocate portions of its geographic bureaus from Washington, D.C., forward into their regions and construct an operational level planning and execution capacity. This paper explains the nature of the problem; historical and current DOS culture and organization; and some of the military's experience with nation building. Also examined are several current initiatives being undertaken by DOS directed from the strategic level, absent any operational control, coordination, and planning, then executed by the tactical level at numerous overseas posts. Finally, the paper establishes conclusions and provides specific recommendations. Implementation of the recommendations would result in operational capacity for the DOS, regional focus and leadership for the interagency (in coordination with the GCCs), thereby employing all elements of national power to secure the strategic objectives of the United States.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.**

**Department of State – Why It Must Develop Operational Capacity**

**by**

**David Monroe, CIV, DoS**

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

## **Abstract**

### *Department of State – Why It Must Develop Operational Capacity.*

The continuing coordination and implementation of the civilian interagency arena is proceeding in the wrong direction. Integration within existing geographic combatant commands (GCCs) will not provide civilian interagency members the required leadership, authorities, funding or coordination needed to develop a robust operational and regional capacity and capability. This is essential for the nation to effectively employ all elements of its power. Additionally, the Department of State (DOS) is currently designated as the lead agency for overseas efforts of the civilian interagency. To accomplish this successfully requires conducting sustained engagement on a regional basis and the requisite authority to lead interagency efforts. The DOS must relocate portions of its geographic bureaus from Washington, D.C., forward into their regions and construct an operational level planning and execution capacity. This paper explains the nature of the problem; historical and current DOS culture and organization; and some of the military's experience with nation building. Also examined are several current initiatives being undertaken by DOS directed from the strategic level, absent any operational control, coordination, and planning, then executed by the tactical level at numerous overseas posts. Finally, the paper establishes conclusions and provides specific recommendations. Implementation of the recommendations would result in operational capacity for the DOS, regional focus and leadership for the interagency (in coordination with the GCCs), thereby employing all elements of national power to secure the strategic objectives of the United States.

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## **Department of State – Why It Must Develop Operational Capacity**

On 28 February, 2008, General William E. "Kip" Ward, U. S. Army, the geographical combatant commander (GCC), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), addressed the student body and faculty of the Naval War College. General Ward's command is new, created and organized primarily to conduct Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) throughout Africa. AFRICOM incorporates responsibilities from three other GCCs and is preparing to enhance continent-wide security and stability via engagement with multiple, partner nation militaries. This will enhance the commands ability to foster regional peace and prosperity throughout Africa. More importantly, AFRICOM has included large numbers of U.S. civilian representatives (interagency) within its structure who possess a wide range of talent and knowledge not normally resident within the Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>1</sup> Following the example and evolving structure of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), AFRICOM is preparing to engage at Phase Zero, the military name for "operationalizing TSC," or shaping, stabilizing and securing a geographic region or theater.<sup>2</sup> The GCCs are pursuing these supremely important but involved and difficult agendas in addition to their multitude of military responsibilities. Lack of appropriate legislation and political will has created a void within which civilian agencies cannot coordinate regional events at an operational level. Fulfilling the goals of the National Security Strategy will require the United States to establish appropriate mechanisms effectively coordinating the civilian agencies of the U.S. government, vice injecting them into existing military structures.

To establish civilian component capacity and capability within the interagency environment, the Department of State (DOS), leading interagency efforts overseas, must establish regional, operational level offices, modeled upon the GCCs, to promote effective long-term regional

engagement, stability and security. Regional engagement requires all elements of national power, not just military action or representatives of civilian agencies attached within existing military organizations who provide an interagency support mechanism. Redesigning, experimenting and patching together Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATFs) and other structures within the GCCs suggest that the U.S. government is pursuing another less effective path. Current structure and policy ignore the problem of overburdening our military by distracting them from their primary missions and, more specifically, overwhelming the GCCs. In the absence of the DOS' operational capacity and capability, the GCCs have become diplomats and experts in finance, development and economics, bearing the burden of reconstruction, stabilization and security for countries within their regions.

This paper suggests the DOS be granted appropriate authority and subsequent interagency efforts follow the GCC organizational example. Discussion will include the historical organization, roles and missions of the DOS; select military experiences outside of traditional roles; recent efforts by the DOS to engage current and expected challenges; and the consequences of failure. Proper alignment and utilization of all elements of national power are of critical importance. The United States must engage the developing world by developing partnerships on a regional and country level, then sustain those relationships over generations. Unfortunately, current authorities, structures and funding prohibit this approach.

The DOS geographic organizational model is over sixty years old and no longer relevant. It must be realigned to reflect the significant changes of the past eighteen years, since the conclusion of the Cold War. Whereas Congress has reorganized, funded, equipped and maintained the U.S. military to accomplish new objectives related to nation building, the DOS and other civilian agencies have not received this attention, thought or action. To understand

why the DOS has not truly transformed, despite numerous plans to meet present requirements, one must examine its history.

### *A culture of status quo*

The Department of State is organized and operates in much the same fashion as it did during and immediately following World War II (WWII). Prior to WWII, the DOS was:

less than a quarter of its present size, made up at home and abroad of twelve hundred officers and twenty-nine hundred other employees. With the Bureau of the Budget it shared the Old State, War and Navy Building on Pennsylvania Avenue, across West Executive Avenue from the White House, and had bureaus scattered all over town.<sup>3</sup>

Prior to the war, the DOS was primarily concerned with incidents interfering with American commerce or when foreign nations intervened in the Western Hemisphere. Most Department business focused upon treaties of commerce or navigation and later arbitration. Another large part of daily DOS business involved helping Americans overseas who were in trouble or encountered resistance to engaging in business. After WWII, the current organization and mission of the DOS emerged. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson summarized why the DOS operated as it did.

Most matters that concerned the Department arose from specific incidents or problems and then evolved into policies, rather than beginning as matters of broad decision and ending in specific action. In this way the departmental division having jurisdiction to deal with the incident became the basic instrument for the formulation and execution of policy. Having a supposed monopoly of knowledge of the subject matter, it advised the Secretary on the action, if any, to be taken in the case at hand – thus becoming a formulator of policy – and, after the Secretary's decision, had charge of transmitting instructions to the field.<sup>4</sup>

Secretary Acheson also described how the DOS organized and exercised its authority in a manner still used to the present day.

Bureaucratic power had come to rest in the division chiefs and the advisors, political, legal, and economic. To the traditional four geographic divisions



– American Republics, European, Near Eastern, Far Eastern – and the Legal Advisor, had been added, after the First World War, the Passport and Visa divisions, with almost absolute power to decide who might leave and enter the country. The heads of all these divisions, like barons in a feudal system weakened at the top by mutual suspicion and jealousy between king and prince, were constantly at odds, if not at war. Their frontiers, delimited in some cases by geography and in others by function, were vague and overlapping.<sup>5</sup>

The basic situation described by Secretary Acheson, although over time refined, streamlined and modernized, has not changed. While strategic policy is formulated in Washington and directed to the field, those decisions are transmitted directly to the Ambassador (the President's personal representative), the overseas post, at the tactical level. Within State, the cable (automated message), reigns supreme. The departmental divisions are still in charge of "transmitting instructions to the field".

Boundaries are determined by function or geography and petty rivalries continue to mitigate effective implementation of strategic policies. More importantly, although regional bureaus have existed for decades, they possess no operational focus or capability, reside in Washington, D.C., monitor individual country issues and transmit instructions to the DOS' 295 overseas posts in over 190 countries.<sup>6</sup> Embassies contacting their regional bureaus in Washington speak to "desk officers" focused on specific countries. The bureaus do not have forward representation in their regions and do not generally exercise vision above a bilateral level. This has to change.

The call to modernize and reorganize the DOS is not new. However, implementation of operational level capacity has never been attempted. Since WWII, the Department has been the center of numerous administrations' headaches. President Kennedy was exasperated repeatedly by DOS' inability to "take charge" in foreign affairs. "To the end, the Department remained a puzzle to the President. No one ran it; Rusk, Ball, and (Averell) Harriman constituted a loose

triumvirate on the seventh floor and, passing things back and forth among themselves, managed to keep a few steps ahead of crisis.”<sup>7</sup>

To increase its effectiveness and responsiveness, the DOS has attempted to reorganize and reinvent itself numerous times. In January 1993, an internal study concluded with recommendations for thirty-eight specific organizational changes. Yet, none of those changes planned for or provided the Department with any operational capability.<sup>8</sup> While many proposed and subsequently implemented changes improved daily operations, personnel assignments and management practices, no change improved Department or interagency interaction with other departments or agencies of the U.S. government or the outside world. The 1993 study emphasized clearly the DOS’ three core roles, which have not changed since the Department completed this study. These roles are: (1) policy formulation across the range of international issues; (2) implementation or conduct of foreign relations; and (3) coordination of major overseas programs and activities of government.<sup>9</sup>

While there are many interesting aspects of the report, two stand out as unusually prophetic regarding the Department’s future and its three core roles. The first relates to enhanced peacekeeping.

The Department must take the lead in a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping and other aspects of cooperative security. We see a need for: a central focus in the State Department to coordinate policy and monitor specific peacekeeping and other multilateral security and humanitarian actions; an operational and logistics center; a long range planning office for U.S. involvement; and high-level interagency attention to the subject.<sup>10</sup>

The second recommendation proposes establishing an Under Secretary for Regional and Multilateral Affairs.

This study proposes a new structure and distribution of functions at the Under Secretary level, with the objective of ensuring more focused and

integrated approaches to the new, post Cold War policy agenda. Of necessity, all of the Department's principals will be deeply engaged in the effort to develop multilateral approaches and institutions for pursuing key objectives, whether they concern economics, security, the environment, or other global issues.<sup>11</sup>

These initiatives would have provided the DOS with operational capabilities at a regional level involving peacekeeping, multilateral security, humanitarian relief, economic and environmental issues and an ability to coordinate interagency efforts. After sixteen years, the DOS has yet to implement these and other recommendations providing an operational ability, focused by region and leading a robust, coordinated interagency team, capable of focusing all the elements of power to achieve the nation's strategic objectives. Meanwhile, Presidential administrations have repeatedly called upon the military to lead most of the above missions, globally. Why is the military called upon so frequently? Many reasons contribute to their utilization, but one is a long history of small and massive, complicated reconstruction efforts that were extremely successful.

*After all, ... they've done it before*

The United States' experience with Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) is not contemporary. Our first major experience following WWII was colossal. America rebuilt Japan and Germany from smoldering ashes. While the military was in charge of administering and rebuilding both former Axis powers, these situations share both similarities and notable differences compared with current U.S. efforts. In Japan, the military SSTR effort closely resembled a dictatorship over a completely vanquished former enemy.

MacArthur was the indisputable overlord of occupied Japan, and his underlings functioned as petty viceroys. At the hub of GHQ (General Headquarters) activities in the unbombed section of downtown Tokyo, a cadre of American military and civilian bureaucrats (roughly 1,500 in early 1946, peaking at 3,200 in January 1948) operated what Theodore Cohen, an energetic participant, aptly characterized as a "new, super-government."<sup>12</sup>

While, the model used in Japan was not perfect, in many circumstances, it worked. The American government remembered it working and with the military being in charge.

As in Japan, the U.S. military rebuilt a devastated Germany, and with her much of Europe. Even though the military led and rebuilt Germany through General Lucius Clay, Commander of the Office of Military Government, and Military Governor of Germany, the reconstruction took longer to implement than it did in Japan. Germany had been equally, if not more severely shattered, than Japan. Reconstruction did not begin in earnest until June of 1947. The military provided security and stability from the end of the war. Nonetheless, due only to a growing and imminent Soviet threat, did the United States provide other assistance, (for example, the Berlin Airlift), and facilitate the reconstruction of Germany and Europe as a whole.

The desperate economic plight of Western Europe persuaded Marshall to announce a comprehensive program of American assistance, the European Recovery Act or Marshall Plan, on June 5, 1947. The Marshall Plan in concert with the Truman Doctrine, marked a fundamental change in American policy toward Europe, driven by deepening concerns over the consolidation of communist power in Eastern Europe, the failure to reach a settlement on Germany's future, and the deepening economic disarray in Western Europe that threatened political stability, especially in France and Italy.<sup>13</sup>

Both America and the world witnessed dramatic success as a result of robust, military-led SSTR operations in both Europe and Japan. The U.S. military's extensive power made this possible. Still, because the U.S. government retains this example as a proof of concept, the reality that this was a different time and with completely different conditions is forgotten. By presence alone, the military provided security and stability enabling reconstruction. Our former enemies had been completely destroyed, lacking the most basic services and institutions. In this example, the military was asked to rebuild specific countries from ruin, not shape an entire region or regions throughout the world. The agencies and missions of today did not exist after

WWII. There were far fewer countries fifty years ago and neither the international community nor the U.S. had yet developed globalization, shaping theories, theatre security cooperation, or regional approaches to multilateral issues. Therefore, although the military was able to successfully implement massive SSTR projects after WWII, this does not mean they are the appropriate tool for success in today's world. Furthermore, this does not mean the DOS and interagency have completely ignored the problem of coordinating and implementing the elements of national power. Yet, their significant efforts have been misdirected. Specific programs and efforts aimed at individual countries lack the critically necessary multilateral approach fostering regional solutions capable of delivering stability and prosperity.

### ***Strategic direction and tactical implementation***

Since the events of 9/11, the DOS has implemented numerous strategically planned and tactically executed initiatives in an attempt to coordinate the interagency, to perform SSTR and conduct regional engagement. As previously identified, the efforts of strategic-level direction continue to be pushed to the tactical level of bilateral engagement. While this hard work may have strategic effects, they are executed in response to specific events within individual countries.

For example, the DOS created the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to effectively execute SSTR in the future. The S/CRS is designed to, “organize the U.S government, all civilian agencies, to bring the assets of those agencies to bear on a stabilization crisis overseas where American interests are at stake.”<sup>14</sup> Ambassador John Herbst, coordinator for the office, guided creation of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. The initiative includes divisions of personnel into Active, Standby and Civilian Reserve Response Corps. Plans include several thousand identified individuals and pre-staged, support equipment, prepared to deploy

and implement SSSTR in response to future crisis. Unfortunately, the initiative assumes the U.S. will require this capability again built upon our recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also a tactical response to strategic direction. Moreover, Congress has not adequately funded the initiative and S/CRS' focus remains on individual countries and is reactionary. This does nothing to provide sustained engagement and a daily, integrated, regional operational capacity. At best, it provides a tactical response of limited duration. S/CRS might temporarily provide the desired strategic effects but it is completely devoid of operational level, sustained, regional impacts.

Another initiative, instituted by the current Secretary of State, is "Transformational Diplomacy." Much discussion inside the Department concerns exactly what Transformational Diplomacy means and how to implement its tenets. One significant pillar involves increasing the presence of diplomats within the developing world, shifting presence away from established diplomatic representation in Europe and elsewhere. The idea is to proactively engage where there are significant problems and continual turmoil. The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy explained:

The scope and complexity of the changes facing the nation demand that the United States transform and strengthen its foreign affairs institutions. Military power is critically necessary, but is insufficient on its own to secure the interests of the American people. The effectiveness of our diplomatic and development capabilities must equal that of our armed forces. In the face of unprecedented strategic and technological changes, the Committee supports an enhanced diplomacy that orchestrates all instruments of national power, engages the full range of international partners and the public, and proactively shapes long-term global conditions in ways consistent with our national interests.<sup>15</sup>

Additionally, Transformational Diplomacy calls for change in six broad categories:

“(1) expanding and modernizing the workforce; (2) integrating foreign affairs strategy and resources; (3) strengthening our ability to shape the world; (4) harnessing 21<sup>st</sup> century technology; (5) engaging the private sector; and (6) streamlining the Department of State’s organizational structure.”<sup>16</sup> While commendable in many respects, Transformational Diplomacy falls short in at least two key areas. The Department can accomplish very little expanding, modernizing and harnessing without ample funding, and Congress has not provided enough funding. Moreover, shifting personnel to areas of concern, establishing American Presence Posts (individual Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) located at remote, austere locations, (APPs), and again streamlining structure and processes fails to establish regional presence, multilateral collaboration, operational coordination and implementation of the interagency. The APPs do foster relationships, expand presence and promote strategic communications, but at the tactical level, within individual nation states. Unfortunately, this is not what the civilian interagency or the military urgently requires.

Two, senior FSOs commented on problems facing the DOS and interagency. The first officer is a Brigadier General equivalent of significant experience in development and post-conflict stabilization, most recently operating a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. His most important comments suggest an imperative for adequate authority. “If DOS is truly the lead for interagency coordination, vice the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or other cabinet member, Congress or appropriate executive decisions must grant proper authority via established executive and legislative processes. As an Ambassador exercises authority over a country team (interagency members at an embassy), a regional coordinator exercising operational planning and direction requires authority understood and followed by all participants.”<sup>17</sup>

The second FSO is a Major General equivalent whose assignments include service as a Chief of Mission and Political Advisor (POLAD) to a GCC made additional suggestions. “The daily business of the DOS is diplomacy, often conducted in places and methods far removed from SSTR operations. However, though the U.S. may not require another SSTR effort for many years, the Department is obligated to prepare for this future obligation. To support this, the creation of a specific “cone” (the FSO career track with a degree of expertise in a functional area) for Stability and Reconstruction (S&R) Operations has been suggested to senior management within the Department. Another idea proposed creation of a “super bureau”, at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) responsible for operational planning and coordination with DOD.”<sup>18</sup> Since JFCOM is the hub of the unified commands this makes a great deal of sense. Still, it still does not provide regional coordination and sustained engagement.

Regardless of how the civilian agencies ultimately transform, recent remarks by Secretary Rice clearly state the challenge before the government.

So our success will depend on unity of effort between our civilian and military agencies. Our fighting men and women can create opportunities for progress and buy time and space. But it is our diplomats and development professionals who must seize this opportunity to support communities who are striving for democratic values, economic advancement, social justice, and educational opportunity. It is by nurturing the prospect of hope that we defeat the purveyors of hate.<sup>19</sup>

Arguably, since WWII and certainly since 9/11, the military has bought time and space and borne the challenge of regional engagement, cooperation and collaboration. Another report, published by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, describes U.S. Embassies as “command posts” in an anti-terror campaign. The report covers the increase of Special Operations Forces operating from U.S Embassies, under the authority of the Ambassador,



conducting military-to-military training under the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program.

Yet, the report also outlines how the military had to take on emergency reconstruction tasks.

There has been an effort to create a more robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments, but the State Department organized effort is still nascent and civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling together ad hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are limited in number. As a result, military civil affairs teams have built bridges, schools and hospitals, organized local political councils and provided humanitarian relief.<sup>20</sup>

This demonstrates useful, successful tactical actions, perhaps with strategic effects, but absent operational level control, coordination, direction, planning and implementation. Crucial, in the immediate future, diplomats, specialists within the U.S. government and development professionals must consolidate their efforts, under a DOS lead, organized at the regional level with operational focus. As a nation we must stop over-tasking the military and distracting them from their primary responsibilities. Incredibly, there are some who do not believe the U.S. should be in the nation building business and advocate a return to isolationism and disengagement from the developing world.

### ***Why bother?***

A counter-argument to theatre engagement, security cooperation and multinational collaboration at an operational level is framed as follows. “In an age in which international terrorism could just as plausibly come from Marseilles as from Tashkent, America cannot afford to lose its focus and sap its strength by attempting to build nations.”<sup>21</sup> Whether using military forces or civilian expertise, the argument contends failed states or instability itself do not pose a threat to the United States, therefore, indifference is perhaps the best policy.

Technically speaking, this argument is correct. “Nation states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their

governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens.”<sup>22</sup> It is not the failure of states that should concern the United States. The failed or badly governed state usually does not constitute a national security problem for the U.S. More precisely, the concern is what can occur within the failed state, the establishment of terrorist cells and or training camps, drug and other forms of trafficking and other threats to civilized society. Therefore, it is the second and third order effects of the failed state necessitating American intervention. Such effects strongly suggest the DOS’ engagement at the regional level working with multiple partners, preventing states from collapsing and transforming weak, parasitic states into contributing members of the international community. Finally, the military, freed from concentration on SSTR, nation building and other tasks removing it from core competencies will be prepared to intervene should a nation fail and become inhabited by threats.

Another argument, opposing DOS leadership of the interagency, is integration with the military is working. The realignment of the GCCs, incorporating significant interagency experience is the road map to the future. The GCCs have the facilities, logistical support, communications and both financial and personnel support to provide their civilian interagency partners a base from which to conduct operations at a regional level. This argument is flawed for three reasons. First, the type of engagement (economic, law enforcement, finance, rule of law) required by the interagency is removed, separate and distinct from the core competencies of the military whose personnel and institutions must prepare for engagements across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) including SSTR. Second, by instituting such an arrangement (as has been the case) inequities in funding and resources are not identified and thereby not fixed. The DOS FY 2009 Budget is 11.2 billion dollars and the entire International Affairs Budget is

39.5 billion dollars.<sup>23</sup> Compared to the annual DOD budget, not counting supplemental funding, those amounts are small. The inequities in funding and resource allocation must be fixed and one way to accomplish this is breaking away from ad hoc organizations and structures. Finally, the necessary legislation providing appropriate authorities to the civilian agencies will not occur until they are forced to operate with reduced military support.

Integration into the existing military structures is not the answer. This path is also detrimental in other areas including erosion of military capabilities, failure to obtain solutions of root problems using effective interagency coordination and failure of the DOS to provide appropriate leadership in its core responsibilities. Examination of the United States' efforts over the past ten years shows an overreliance on military power but also provides lessons on how to improve our efforts.

#### ***Establish Operational Capability and Engage Regionally (Conclusion)***

The Department of State should be directed to establish regional, operational level offices, modeled upon the GCCs, to promote effective regional engagement, stability and security. It should also lead and coordinate the civilian interagency and do so at a regional level seeking multilateral engagement, collaboration and cooperation. The military cannot and should not be asked to accomplish everything. Former Senator Sam Nunn delivered another criticism that directly addresses the problem. "Externally, organizational shortcomings in the interagency system undermine DOD in carrying out its mission."<sup>24</sup> Senator Nunn was identifying the organizational concept for national security is too narrow and lacks integration between departments and agencies of the government in actively pursuing national security objectives.<sup>25</sup> These organizational deficiencies also undermine the interagency.

The interagency must be positioned to handle crisis before the military is required. The focus of many civilian agencies requires realignment from only a domestic, internal concentration to encompass an outward, regionally engaged, global perspective. Events occurring in Bujumbura, Sao Paulo, Rangoon, and dozens of other capitals around the world impact American lives throughout our country. How can the DOS lead the interagency, achieve integration and develop operational capability? Following are some recommendations.

- Although a strategic consideration, this will have significant operational impact. Realign the geographical boundaries of DOS and the military to match. For example, the DOS and DOD each have six defined regions of the world but the regions overlap. Aligning the regions will remove ambiguous situations, strengthen regional unity of effort and enhance communication and coordination among both organizations. (Figure 1)

- Relocate parts of the geographical, DOS Bureaus from Washington, D.C. forward into their respective regions. Provide suitable support to each of the six Regional Assistant Secretaries regarding facilities, personnel, equipment and training. Physically locate regional headquarters near, co-located with the GCCs, or where they will provide the greatest benefit.

- This will reduce domestic assignments to performance with the remaining bureau structure in Washington, D.C., a functional bureau, or training and education at numerous locations. Structure not located forward can continue coordination, on a daily basis, with the multiple agencies within the executive branch, the legislative branch and a multitude of other government and non-government organizations.

- Ensure key staff personnel obtain appropriate education, such as, the military staff colleges. This provides a superb understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of engagement. Additionally, the FSO staff will understand how to implement Washington's

strategic directions into regional policies and coordinated, individual embassy actions.

Discontinue the practice of only assigning desk officers to specific countries. A new regional organization, for example EUR, (Europe) would retain country expertise but become operationally focused and concerned at an appropriate level.

- The Secretary of State Conduct will conduct coordination between the Principals Coordinating Committee (the leadership of the Executive Branch cabinet members (PCC)) and each region via a Regional Director (Assistant Secretary) mirroring the GCC relationship to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense. While the Ambassador would remain the President's personal representative to a specific country and retain direct lines of communication with Washington, the regionally forward bureaus would provide coordinated operational level guidance and policy.

- Enactment of new legislation from Congress, in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, or presidential directives, or both, establishing critical authorities and strengthening the DOS' mandate as leader, coordinator and integrator of overseas, interagency efforts. Legislation should clarify and establish an interagency team, led by the DOS, as responsible for SSTR operations, multilateral collaboration on many fronts, theater engagement, and regional solutions providing long-term stability and improvement. The military retains its mandate for theater security cooperation, military to military engagement and providing security in support of regional initiatives.

- A comprehensive review of funding and budgets is of utmost importance. Congress might reallocate a portion of the DOD budget or find other sources to adequately fund a unified, interagency effort. The disparity in funding between DOD and DOS should be reduced by the numerous congressional committees involved in the budget process. The diplomatic and

military elements of national power should be balanced. In many cases reducing military presence will assist U.S. efforts. Nonetheless, the military must remain prepared for both the big and small wars of the future. Meanwhile, the DOS can conduct regional, operational level engagement but this requires adequate funding.

### ***Time is of the essence***

There are two overriding beliefs guiding the premise of regional, operational engagement. The first is people on the ground usually know what needs to be done. Those in the region will know the regional problems and possible solutions. Regional stability and prosperity result from good governance. Good governance requires institutional reforms.

In terms of institutional reform, not only does the impetus not come primarily from Washington, knowledge about how to do them ultimately cannot come from Washington, it really has to come from people who understand both the formal and informal rules by which their societies work and are governed.<sup>26</sup>

Second and more important, the U.S. needs to do better. The below observation describes the lack of interagency cooperation and regional effort in attempting to reconstruct the war-torn nation of Afghanistan.

In addition, within PRTs there is no unified chain of command. Civilian agency representatives report to their superiors in embassies or capitals. Personalities, local environment, domestic politics, capacity and funding of the lead nation all determine PRT priorities and programs. Moreover, there is no rationale for distributing resources among provinces on the basis of the size of the economy of the PRT lead nation. There is no coordination mechanism for aid going through PRTs. Finally, since there are no agreed goals and objectives for the PRT program, it is impossible to evaluate fairly its performance on the local level and on the programmatic level.<sup>27</sup>

In summation, the United States' key goal of fostering democracy is a smart and rational policy. As the noted writer and professor Dr Fukuyama stated:

The fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies is evident in

the extraordinary peaceful relations they maintain among one another. There is by now a substantial body of literature noting the fact that there have been few, if any, instances of one liberal democracy going to war with another.<sup>28</sup>

However, the United States must realign its elements of diplomatic and military power to provide stability, security, and prosperity in the emerging nations of the world. To do so effectively our national leadership has to provide the DOS the funding, training and organization it requires to lead and coordinate the interagency. The Department ought to move portions of its geographic bureaus forward and engage multilaterally, finding and exploiting solutions at the regional level. The DOS must engage the world, finding answers to multiple but unique regional problems. Our military must be prepared to defend the nation and provide security as required. Forward based, regional bureaus can provide critical, operational level guidance, stitching things together and providing seamless links between strategic guidance promulgated from Washington, D.C. to individual overseas posts, executing their diplomatic missions at the foreign services' equivalent of a tactical level engagement. Now is the time to take action.

## Endnotes

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U.S. Department of Defense Commanders' Areas of Responsibility




Figure 1